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RECENT DECISIONS
In short, to the serviceman, trial by military tribunals is due process.2 6
To the civilian it is not.
ROBERT D. ARCHIBALD
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PUBLIC FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO A
PRIVATE ORGANIZATION FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE IN OHIO
The relating taxpayers attempted to enjoin state officers from paying
funds appropriated by the General Assembly to war veterans organizations.'
The appropriation bill, as enacted -by the General Assembly, granted specific
sums of money to the veterans organizations for the purpose of rehabilitating
war veterans and promoting patriotism. 2 Relators alleged that the veterans
institutions are private groups organized for private purposes, and are there-
fore prohibited from receiving any credit out of state funds.3 The trial
court found the appropirations act unconstitutional and enjoined distribu-
tion of the funds. The court of appeals reversed this decision and declared
the appropriations to be valid.
It is well established that public funds must be expended for public
purposes.4 The meaning of public purpose as construed by the Ohio
courts may be found in Cooley's treatise on Constitutional Limitations.5
Cooley states that the legislature should determine what is a public purpose,
and this legislative discretion should not be controlled -by the courts.0 The
Ohio General Assembly through this controversial enactment interpreted
the rehabilitation of war veterans and the promotion of patriotism as public
purposes.
With the element of public purpose seemingly fulfilled, the court was
confronted with the legality of appropriating public funds for private or-
ganizations to be expended for a public purpose. In State ex rel. Leaverton
v. Kerns,7 the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld appropriations for an inde-
pendent agricultural society which were expended for the purpose of hold-
ing an annual agricultural fair for the benefit of the public. Such appropria-
tions for private organizations were thought to be valid so long as there was
no intention of distributing the profits among its members. And again in
State ex rel. Pugh v. Sayre,8 the Supreme Court of Ohio approved an alloca-
tion for a private corporation, the Franklin County Law Library Association,
'Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911).
'Other law review discussions of this problem include: 29 CALIF. S. B. J. 125
(1954); 4 MTN. L. REv. 79 (1920); 25 MISS. L. J. 277 (1954); 32 N.C. L. REv.
1 (1954); 30 N. DAK. L. RV. 155 (1954); 25 OKLA. B. A. J. 1605 (1954); 28
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 301 (1954); 7 VAND. L. REV. 144 (1954); 40 VA. L. REV. 331
(1954).
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since the library was accessible to, and used by, all the officers exercising
judicial functions in the county.
Even with the two aforementioned cases as precedent, the court was
still in doubt as to the constitutionality of the instant appropriations act.
In Ohio, the expressly granted power of the judiciary to declare a law un-
constitutional is to be exercised with the greatest possible care and reserve.9
The regularly enacted statutes of the General Assembly are presumed to be
constitutional,10 and are so held unless proved clearly unconstitutional be-
yond a reasonable doubt." Since there was an element of doubt as to the
unconstitutionality of the statute, the majority of the court was forced to
vote in favor of its validity.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Hart, with whom Weygandt, C. J., and
Griffith, Jr., concurred, took issue as to what constituted a public purpose.
He stated that the expenditure of public funds for 'The exclusive use and
benefit of their soldier members ... and certain other soldiers whom they
select" did not fall within the meaning of a public purpose. This appears
'Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955).
'Amended House Bill No. 10 of the 100th General Assembly. "This appropriation
bill grants the following designated veterans organizations specific amounts as
follows:
American Legion of Ohio ------------------------------------- $72,375
Department of American Veterans of World War II ----------------- $14,475
Disabled American Veterans of World War II --------------------- $72,375
83rd Division of A.E.F. Veterans' Association ---------------------- $ 482
Ohio Rainbow Division --------------------------------------- $ 4,826
United Spanish War Veterans ---------------------------- $23,160
37th Division A.E.F. Veterans' Association -------- ------- $ 5,790
Veterans of Foreign Wars ------------------------------------- $72,375
These appropriations are made subject to reports by each of these organizations
semi-annually to the state controlling board and no release of funds for any six-month
period shall be made until the state controlling board has received a report of the
expenditures made from these appropriations for the prior six-month period."
sOHio CoNST. Art. VIII, § 4: "The credit of the state shall not, in any manner, be
given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual association or corporation whatever."
"State v. Moore, 76 Ark. 197, 88 S.W. 881 (1905); Patty v. Colgan, 97 Cal. 251,
31 Pac. 1133 (1893); Burnham v. Beverly, 309 Mass. 388, 35 N.E.2d 242 (1941);
Bush v. Orange County, 159 N.Y. 212, 53 N.E. 1121 (1899).
'Walker v. City of Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14, 8 Am. Rep. 24 (1871).
a COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 129 (3d ed. 1874).
'104 Ohio St. 550, 136 N.E. 217 (1922).
'90 Ohio St. 215, 107 N.E. 512 (1914).
'State ex feZ. Turner v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 96 Ohio St. 250, 258
117 N.E. 232, 234 (1917).
1 State v. Parker, 150 Ohio St. 22, 80 N.E.2d 490 (1948); State cx rel. Mack v.
Gluckenberger, 139 Ohio St. 273, 39 N.E.2d 840 (1942).
'Williams v. Scudder, 102 Ohio St. 305, 131 N.E. 481 (1921); State ex rel. Dur-
bin v. Smith, 102 Ohio St. 591, 133 N.E. 457 (1921); City of Xenia v. Schmidt,
101 Ohio St. 437, 130 N.E. 24 (1920); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 CRANCH) 86
(1810); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 WHEAT.) 213 (1827).
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to be a judicial condemnation of the legislature's wisdom in enacting such a
bill. But such a condemnation is an exercise beyond the scope of judicial
authority in this state.' 2 Judge Bell, with whom Taft, J., concurred, em-
phasized this very point in his concurring opinion. He felt the majority
opinion was correct as to the judgment, but refused to concede the wisdom
of the enactment.
The conclusion reached by the majority of the court is not in accord
with the decisions of most states. The legislatures of many states have not
hesitated to appropriate funds for the promotion of patriotism, 13 but not
through private corporations. Generally, where a state constitution con-
tains an article prohibiting the granting of aid to private corporations, ap-
propriations such as the instant one have been struck down even though
public benefits were derived therefrom.14 But in Illinois, Kentucky, and
Pennsylvania, appropriations through private organizations for a public
purpose have been upheld.1 5 One decision construed the private corpora-
tion to be an agent of the municipality.16 The underlying theory, however,
as interpreted by the great weight of authority, seems to be that it is im-
material whether the dispensing agency is public or not, so long as it has
a public purpose.'7
It appears from the majority opinion of this case that the law in Ohio
is now settled; the appropriation of public funds to a private organization
for a public purpose is a valid enactment of the legislature, and not violative
of the credit clause of the Ohio Constitution.
CLIFFORD MERLE LYTLE, JR.
"State ex rel. Cooper v. Roth, 140 Ohio St. 377, 44 N.E.2d 456 (1942); State ex
rel. Clinger v. White, 143 Ohio St. 175, 54 N.E.2d 308 (1944).
'Allied Architects' Asso. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431, 221 Pac. 209 (1923); Veterans'
Welfare Bd. v. Riley, 189 Cal. 159, 208 Pac. 678 (1922); Barrow v. Bradley, 190
Ky. 480, 227 S.W. 1016 (1921); Kingman v. Brockton, 153 Mass. 255, 26 N.E.
998 (1891); Parsons v. Van Wyck, 56 App. Div. 329, 67 N.Y. Supp. 1054 (1st
Dep't. 1000); Morton v. Philadelphia, 4 Pa. Dist 523 (1895).
"'Stone v. State, 223 Ala. 426, 136 So. 727 (1931); Fluharty v. Nez Perce County,
29 Idaho 203, 158 Pac. 320 (1916); State ex rel. St. Louis School &Museum v. St.
Louis, 216 Mo. 47, 115 S.W. 534 (1909); Harrington v. Atteberry, 21 N.M. 50,
153 Pac. 1041 (1915); Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 141 Pac. 892 (1914);
Daytona Beach v. King, 132 Fla. 273, 181 So. 1 (1938).
' Sambor v. Hadley, 291 Pa. 395, 140 Ad. 347 (1928); Furlong v. South Park, 340
Ill. 363, 172 N.E. 757 (1930); Hager v. Kentucky Children's Home Society, 119
Ky. 235, 83 S.W. 605 (1904).
" Sambor v. Hadley, supra note 15.
"Hager v. Kentucky Children's Home Society, 119 Ky. 235, 83 S.W. 605 (1904);
"These authorities dearly settle that the vital point in all such appropriations is
whether the purpose is public; and that, if it is, it does not matter whether the agency
through which it is dispensed is public or is not; that the appropriation is not made
for the agency, but for the object which it serves; the test is in the end, not in the
means."
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